ALN Protests the Passage of Vietnam’s Decree 109/2026
 and its Abusive Targeting of Lawyers and Legal Activities

1. Introducing Vietnam’s Decree 109/2026

ALN protests the passage on 1 April 2026 of Decree 109/2026 in Vietnam which allows authorities to sanction lawyers with steep administrative fines and suspensions of their license to practice law, as well as to sanction law firms, NGOs, and other legal actors, for their legitimate work, including work to protect clients from certain official abuses and to hold officials accountable. The decree attacks the independence of lawyers and violates the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and we call on Vietnam’s government to repeal the decree.

The decree took effect on 18 May 2026. It has 93 articles in 53 pages and lists a series of administrative violations, their penalties, who is subject to the penalties, and who can impose them. The violations center on various forms of legal work or support which the government deems harmful to the state, which includes violations for standard legal work that limits the independence and freedom of lawyers to work without official harassment or coercion. As one commentator summarized the decree, “By curbing the independence of lawyers and increasing the unchecked power of the police, Vietnam is strengthening its single party authoritarian rule.”[1]

The categories of violations are organized into the fields of legal assistance, judicial administration, marriage and family, civil enforcement, and the recovery of bankruptcy of enterprises and cooperatives.

2. The Types of Problems that the decree raises for lawyers and legal actors

There are numerous problems throughout the list of violations from a human rights perspective, including civil and political rights such as freedom of expression and assembly of rights activists, issues regarding nationality and minority rights under the marriage and family category of violations, and procedural rights for victims to receive remedies for harms such as violations of land rights due to industrial development, environmental harms from development, or abuses or harassment from state officials. However, this note focuses on problems linked to lawyers and legal actors.

Lawyers and legal consultants are specifically mentioned as targets of the violations under the legal assistance category, and the category of judicial administration contains violations targeting parties that are involved in legal education, legal aid, legal support for businesses, international cooperation on law and judicial reform, and state compensation mechanisms, which covers a wide range of legal and law-related actors. The remaining categories, marriage and family, civil enforcement, and business recovery and bankruptcy, by the nature of the work targeted, can be expected to also largely target lawyers involved in those activities. Other actors that the decree targets, including bailiffs, notaries, auctioneers and auction participants, arbitrators and mediators, and those involved in civil enforcement and bankruptcy claims, are also key actors to the healthy functioning of an independent legal and judicial system.

The two major categories of penalties for almost all violations—fines and suspensions of licenses for lawyers, other legal actors, law firms, and other legal organizations to practice—will have a dramatic effect on further undermining rule of law and the independence of lawyers in Vietnam, which is already stressed by the long-standing politicization of the judiciary and legal system.

It is worth noting that generally the highest penalties are given to legal activities which are defined as violations based on its ideological content or political concerns (as opposed to smaller sanctions for procedural violations), further implicating freedom of expression and independence of lawyers from state coercion or control. In this way penalties will have the most chilling effect on the activities and roles of lawyers and legal actors most important in defending their clients against state abuse, due to the state pressure and coercion they present. Lawyers’ ability to freely work on legitimate claims involving state responsibility and politically sensitive issues are of particular concern.

3. Inconsistencies with the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers

There are numerous sources of international human rights and standards which the decree violates, including civil and political rights under the ICCPR, to which Vietnam is a party, including the rights to freedom of expression under Art. 19 and assembly under Art. 21. In the case of lawyers being arbitrarily punished, however, the decree is more specifically inconsistent with the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers in ways described in the following sections. This may include the following principles:


4. Summarizing categories of violations that are problematic for lawyers and legal actors

Below is a short summary of types of violations which either directly target lawyers and legal actors or may be particularly problematic for them.

a. Article 8 Violations regarding the practice of law

Article 8 of the decree lists violations specifically related to the practice of law. Art. 8(3)(d) punishes practicing law in a manner inconsistent with the prescribed practice format, which may be arbitrarily set by officials. Art. 8(7)(e) further punishes “Conduct, statements, or actions that affect the image and reputation of the legal profession or cause damage to the legitimate rights and interests of agencies, organizations, or individuals, but not to the extent of criminal prosecution.”[2] Notably this latter language mirrors nearly identical language of Penal Code Art. 331, which officials have already used to criminally prosecute citizens criticizing the government or exposing official wrongdoing.[3]

One of the major problematic trends found throughout the decree may already be identified here: overbroad and undefined terms define the scope of violations, effectively placing the standard in the opinion of sanctioning officials, such as in this case “affect the image and reputation”, which is not clearly defined. Regarding this violation specifically, also note that authoritative actors within the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Council have consistently warned against defamation and defamation-like claims being used by authoritarian governments to punish and thereby chill and silence legitimate criticism against officials, when legitimate criticism is itself understood by the sanctioning official as punishable speech.[4]

It is perhaps also worth briefly noting the role of the clause “but not to the extent of criminal prosecution” used throughout the decree. Many of the targeted activities, including this one, involve punishing what should be legitimate and protected speech which should not be criminalized to begin with. The decree simply adds an extra layer of arbitrary and harassing potential to these activities by the government to further unjustifiably chill critical or ideologically disfavored speech in cases where criminal sanction would unduly highlight the embarrassment of unjustified punishment.

Art. 8(7)(c) punishes lawyers “personally or assisting clients in committing illegal acts to delay, prolong, or obstruct activities of prosecuting authorities and other state agencies.” This may be problematic if officials arbitrarily interpret legitimate petitions by victims as “illegal acts” to obstruct prosecutors’ or agencies’ abusive work. Art. 8(7)(d) punishes lawyers from “deceiving clients to an extent not yet subject to criminal prosecution,” with the interpretation of “deception” again overbroad and undefined, in the arbitrary opinion of the arresting officer, and at risk of being ideologically based.

The highest penalties (30 to 40 million VND) are reserved for violations under Art. 8(8), with (b) punishing “inciting clients to make false statements or … to file unlawful complaints or denunciations”, directly targeting the content of speech, complaints, and denunciations, and (đ) inducing clients “to gather in large numbers to disrupt public order”, directly targeting freedom of assembly. Again, the scope of falsity, “unlawful complaints and denunciations”, “disruption of public order” are overbroad, undefined, and subject to arbitrary opinion. As mentioned above, the highest penalty targets important roles of lawyers of speaking freely about a client’s grievances, bringing complaints against those committing the grievances, and using public protests as any member of civil society expressing their freedom of expression and assembly. Typical claims of clients invoking government harassment are land rights claims linked to unlawful development and harms linked to government corruption or mismanagement, such as those leaked by whistleblowers. These violations make it possible for officials to also harass and intimidate the lawyers of clients involved in such cases.

Notably, public officials have already appealed to this violation to target lawyers.  Shortly after the decree passed, on April 13, the People’s Committee of Long Thanh commune in Dong Nai province requested the Don’t Nai province Bar Association “to admonish … organizations and individual who exploit people’s trust by guiding them to repeatedly submit numerous complaints and denunciations to leaders and authoritative agencies—actions that undermine credibility and pose a risk to local security and public order.”[5]

b. Article 9 and 11 Violations for Law Firms and Legal Consultation Organizations

Article 9 addresses similar restrictions as those listed above at the organizational level for law firms, with an available penalty being suspension of their operations. Article 10 similarly addresses professional organizations of lawyers. Art. 10(2)(c) punishes them for organizing professional training courses for lawyers in violation of regulations, or failing to report training or the training plan and program. This is notable in that the decree goes further than just controlling the actions of lawyers; it controls their legal education and training. Article 11 regulates legal consultation centers, with Art. 11(3)(a), as above, punishing them for (a) inciting individuals or organizations to provide false information or (b) to request legal advice to file complaints, denunciations, or lawsuits unlawfully, with the same potential problems of overbroad criteria and arbitrary application similar to abusive defamation and libel-like charges as discussed above.

c. Article 25 Violations regarding Judicial Experts

Art. 25(2)(h) punishes judicial experts for issuing an “expert examination conclusion that does not comply with the prescribed form or content” and Art. 25(3)(d) punishes them for providing a false examination conclusion. Both of these are explicitly content-based restrictions on expert opinion for legal processes that not only undermines their freedom of expression, but undermines their independence and ability to issue opinions unbiased by state pressure. Art. 25(3)(b) is notable in punishing the disclosure of confidential information, such as state secrets, in judicial processes; however the conditions of secrecy are also overbroad, creating the risk this violation may be abusively used by officials to arbitrarily define any government information as “secret”, such as information disclosed by a whistleblower, to prevent it from entering judicial processes that may subject government officials to accountability for abuses of power or harms they cause.

d. Article 50, 51, 52, and 54 on Violations regarding legal education, legal reporters, legal cooperation, judicial reform, and legal aid

Chapter III of the decree regulates the procedures and content of legal dissemination and education, as well as international cooperation and judicial reform processes. Like the case of professional training courses mentioned above, these violations go beyond controlling the actions of lawyers. They attempt to control the education and capacity building of lawyers, other legal actors, and the legal system, in particular to use the law to protect victims from state abuses or to reform the government to avoid abuses in ways that are inconsistent with state ideology. The targeted activities are central pillars for building the capacity of the legal system to protect human rights, with lawyers and legally trained persons typically playing the central role, and thus also most vulnerable to penalties under the decree that restrict them from taking such actions.

Article 50(1)(a) punishes persons ostensibly “obstructing citizens’ exercise of their right to information, understanding, and learning about the law.” The concern is that officials may interpret punishable “information, understanding, and learning about the law” as that which does not conform to the state’s official version per se, even if, e.g., it is not only not harmful but is consistent with international standards, creating a violation for teaching citizens the correct understanding of a law under international standards. This again explicitly targets the content of speech and undermines freedom of expression and the good application of the rule of law. On the other side of the coin, Art. 50(1)(b) punishes obstructing legal education by agencies, organizations, and individuals, which similarly may restrict legal actors from addressing possible misinformation by officials or sanctioned outlets about the law, which officials arbitrarily and incorrectly interpret as good information. The potential for such arbitrary and abusive interpretation is one reason content-based punishments are almost always suspect.

Art. 50(2) more directly punishes “providing information or documents containing false, illegal, or immoral content, or content contrary to the good traditions of the people," which again directly punishes the content of speech according to overbroad criteria left at the discretion of officials: “false”, “immoral”, and “contrary to the good traditions of the people.” Article 50(3) further punishes speech based on its ideological content, penalizing “acts of exploiting the dissemination and education of law to distort the Party’s guidelines and policies, and the State’s laws; propagating hostile policies, causing division within the national unity; infringing upon the interests of the State, and the legitimate rights and interests of agencies, organizations, and individuals.” This violation is one of the most direct means the state may use to punish speech underlying dissent or grievances against state abuses on ideological grounds.

Article 52 regulates international cooperation in law and judicial reform. Typical of all authoritarian regimes, numerous violations under the decree punish methods of foreign influence. Similarly as above, many of the violations are about arbitrarily gate-keeping foreign influence by ensuring and controlling their authorization, with Art 52(2) punishing those failing to report international cooperation and judicial reform efforts, as well as (a) the situation and (b) results of such efforts.  Similarly, Art. 52(3)(a) punishes those failing to comply with procedures for consulting with relevant agencies for international activities, Art. 52(3)(b) for organizing international conferences and seminars without permission, Art. 52(3)(b) for organizing such events “on law and judicial reform that do not conform to the content … specified in the approved organizational plan," and Art. 52(5) for implementing projects without (a) approval or (b) not following prescribed procedures.

Article 54 and Article 55 regulates legal aid providers and organizations, respectively, in a similar arbitrarily gate-keeping way, punishing those providing legal aid “where the conditions for [it] are not met” (under Arts. 54(4)(d) and 55(2)(d), respectively), and under Art. 55(2)(c) when it “does not conform to the registered content,” again a content-based restriction liable to arbitrary application.

e. Article 60 and 62 Violations regarding lawyers’ activities in compensation claims

Section 5 of the decree regulates state compensation activities, which often involve lawyers bringing the claims of victims of state-caused harms to court, cases for which lawyers are the most vulnerable to harassment or coercion by officials. Art. 60(2) punishes “Coercing or threatening” (a) the head of the agency directly supervising the public official who caused the damage in making a decision on reimbursement” or (b) “the reimbursement responsibility review council.” The potential issue is again the overbroad and undefined terms “coercing or threatening”, which, like the situation of abusive defamation and related claims described above, an official may arbitrarily interpret to punish legitimate public speech lawyers may use calling for relief for their clients. There is a similar set of violations for civil judgment enforcement under Arts. 65(2)(đ), which punishes “using abusive or insulting language towards public officials during civil enforcement proceedings,” (d) “resisting, obstructing, or inciting others to resist or obstruct the enforcement of civil judgments,” and (e), “disrupting order at the place of judgment enforcement or other acts that hinder the enforcement of civil judgments but do not reach the level of criminal liability.”

f. Chapter VIII on who is authorized to issue administrative violation reports

Finally Chapter VIII lists which officials have authority to draw up administrative violation reports. The relevant authorities vary by the type of violation, typical examples being the director or member of the relevant administrative agency involved in the covered field. The list raises the immediate concern with probable conflicts of interest,[6] as the same officials that are subject of claims by lawyers against them under this decree have the power to punish the lawyers in many cases for that very claim, or some other pretextual violation, as the violations are drafted broadly enough to find a violation in almost any conduct. As one commentator stated, “If lawyers are beholden to these very administrative authorities, they cannot effectively defend citizens against the state.”[7] It is also notable that officials which can punish lawyers include those at the local commune level, such as under Art. 84(1), Art. 89, and for overall responsibility for implementation, Art. 93. While abusive harassment of lawyers and legal actors may occur at any level of government, there may be particular concerns about a proliferation of arbitrary harassment at local levels due to the number and position of officials involved. As the same commentator as above summarized this problem, “a commune-level official who lacks comparable legal expertise can invalidate a certificate earned through years of training.”[8] It is also worth noting that the decree also empowers commune officials to revoke professional licenses, inconsistent with Law on Lawyers Art. 17, which reserves that power exclusively to the minister of justice.[9]

5. Conclusion — Vietnam should repeal Decree 109/2026

This report has surveyed the many ways Decree 109/2026 provides authorities with ways to harass and intimidate lawyers and other legal actors making statements or taking actions which affect their interests. The decree flagrantly violates both international civil and political rights and the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. It creates significant conflicts of interest, as officials subject to legal claims have the power to punish the lawyers targeting them, and it even reaches beyond the immediate harassment of lawyers to control and undermine the legal training of lawyers, legal information provided to the public, and international cooperation and judicial reforms designed to improve rule of law in Vietnam. Virtually all of these provisions are in the service of solidifying the grip of Vietnam’s authoritarian government on to power. For these reasons, we call on the Vietnamese government to repeal the decree in order to protect the role of lawyers and rule of law in Vietnam.

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[1] HRW, "Vietnam: New Retaliatory Decree Targets Lawyers", 23 April 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/23/vietnam-new-retaliatory-decree-targets-lawyers.

[2] The quoted text is from an unofficial translation by Google translate of the original Vietnamese text, available at Decree 109/2026, https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Doanh-nghiep/Nghi-dinh-109-2026-ND-CP-xu-phat-vi-pham-hanh-chinh-trong-linh-vuc-bo-tro-tu-phap-700787.aspx.

[3] See also, IAPL, "Vietnam: New Retaliatory Decree Targets Lawyers", 24 April 2026, https://defendlawyers.wordpress.com/2026/04/24/vietnam-new-retaliatory-decree-targets-lawyers/ .

[4] See, e.g., Human Rights Council Resolution 59/15, 7 July 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/A/hrc/RES/59/15, at 3.

[5] HRW, supra, note 1; IAPL, supra, note 3.

[6] HRW, id.

[7] Trường An, "Amid the Debate Over Court Robes, Lawyers in Việt Nam Face New Pressures From Local Authorities", The Vietnamese, 24 April 2026, https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/amid-the-debate-over-court-robes-lawyers-in-viet-nam-face-new-pressures-from-local-authorities/.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.; Lê Sáng, "Việt Nam’s Decree 109 Sparks Outrage: Commune Chiefs Granted Power to Revoke Law Licenses", 13 April 2026, https://thevietnamese.org/2026/04/viet-nams-decree-109-sparks-outrage-commune-chiefs-granted-power-to-revoke-law-licenses/.